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ABSTRACT 
The Political Cost of Taxation:  
New Evidence from German Popularity Ratings  
by Benny Geys and Jan Vermeir * 
Previous studies indicate that higher tax burdens reduce incumbents’ popularity 
and re-election odds. The present paper offers a new test of this relation for 
German data. Our findings indicate that taxation indeed negatively affects 
German federal government approval ratings, in line with previous international 
research. Nonetheless, the government’s popularity losses do not necessarily 
translate into comparable gains in the opposition’s popularity. In fact, the 
opposition may even lose support when there is ‘divided government’ (i.e. when 
it has some power over policies). Finally, we find some (albeit weak) evidence 
that the costs of taxation are limited to the tax burden imposed by the federal 
government and do not extend to taxes levied at lower levels of government. 
 
Keywords: Taxation, government approval, popularity function, Germany 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Besteuerung und Popularität von Politikern:  
Neue Ergebnisse für die Deutsche Bundesregierung 1978-2003 
Bisherige Untersuchungen zeigen, dass höhere steuerliche Belastungen die 
Beliebtheit und Wiederwahlchancen von Amtsträgern mindern. Das vorliegende 
Papier überprüft diese Beziehung erneut anhand von Daten für Deutschland. 
Übereinstimmend mit internationalen Forschungsergebnissen zeigen unsere 
Resultate, dass Besteuerung die Zustimmung zur Arbeit der Bundesregierung 
tatsächlich negativ beeinflusst. Der Popularitätsverlust der Regierung setzt sich 
jedoch nicht notwendigerweise in vergleichbare Gewinne der Opposition um. 
Vielmehr ist im Falle von „Divided Government“ (d.h. die Opposition trägt 
ebenfalls Regierungsverantwortung) ein Verlust an Unterstützung der Oppo-
sition möglich. Schließlich finden wir Beweise (wenn auch schwache), dass die 
Kosten der Besteuerung durch die von der Bundesregierung auferlegte steuer-
liche Belastung begrenzt sind und nicht von Steuern beeinflusst werden, die 
von nachrangigen Regierungsebenen erhoben werden. 
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1. Introduction 
Scholarship in political science and economics has devoted substantial attention to 
explaining variations over time and space in election results and popularity ratings.1  
This literature on so-called vote and popularity functions (or VP functions) (for reviews, 
see Paldam, 1991; Nannestad and Paldam, 1994) has also addressed the effects of fiscal 
policies on politician’s popularity or re-election chances because, arguably, fiscal 
policies are a sensitive issue for voters. Findings from US nation-wide surveys 
corroborate the latter idea by showing that even when open-ended questions are used, 
taxation was the 4th most important issue in shaping people’s voting decisions for the 
US Congress elections in 2002, after the economy (and employment), education policy 
and international terrorism (e.g. NPR/Kaiser/Kennedy School poll, 23-27 October 2002; 
Pew Research Center/Princeton Survey Research Associates poll, 30 October-2 
November 2002). Taxation generally also features prominently in candidates’ election 
programs and discussions thereof in the media (e.g. Hossain, 2007a, b). Hence, it can be 
expected to influence voters’ assessment of incumbents and become reflected in their 
popularity ratings and election results.  
 
The first studies assessing the effects of taxation on politicians’ popularity and/or re-
election odds already appeared some 40 years ago (e.g. Pomper, 1968; Turett, 1971). 
Nevertheless, as shown below, the findings do not unequivocally support the existence 
of a (hypothesised) negative relation between taxation and politicians’ popularity and/or 
vote share at elections. The present paper adds to this literature in three ways: 
Firstly, we analyse the taxation-popularity nexus using German data. This is important 
since most scholars investigated the US or UK. Given the ambiguity of previous 
findings, an extension to different settings may generate new insights. Thus far, Frey 
and Schneider (1981) and Cusack (1999) are the only two German analyses including a 
measure of taxation, but they restrict themselves to direct income taxation.  In the 
present paper, we take a broader perspective by regarding the overall tax burden (as 
well as its constituent parts). 
Secondly, we not only gauge the effect of taxation on incumbents, but also on the 
opposition.  While some scholars assess the effects of economic variables on opposition 
popularity (e.g. Miller and Mackie, 1973; Feld and Kirchgässner, 2000), the potential 
effects of taxation on the opposition have received much less attention (for exceptions, 
see Paldam and Schneider, 1980; Landon and Ryan, 1997).  Nonetheless, analysing 
opposition popularity may reveal additional information since a loss of popularity for 
the government might – but need not necessarily – translate into increased popularity of 
the opposition.  
Thirdly, we test the proposition that voters consider only the tax burden due to the 
incumbent at a certain level of government (e.g. the federal-level tax burden for the 
federal government). Such a focus may result because this is the tax burden over which 
the incumbent has the most direct influence through its policies. To the best of our 
knowledge, this has not been addressed in previous work. 
 
                                                          
1  Understanding what drives popularity between elections and outcomes on Election Day are different 
though complementary projects (we return to this discussion below).  The present paper concentrates 
on popularity between elections and thus focuses more on the ‘political’ or ‘popular’ costs of taxation 
than the ‘electoral’ costs thereof.  
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The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 brings forward the theoretical 
background for our main hypotheses, while section 3 discusses existing (international) 
work on VP-functions in Germany and the (‘political’ and ‘electoral’; cfr. footnote 1) 
cost of taxation. Section 4 describes the evolution of the total tax burden and 
government and opposition popularity in Germany over the period 1978-2003.  In 
section 5, the latter two data series are brought together to assess the political cost of 
taxation for the government and opposition in Germany. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
The theoretical basis for most studies on VP-functions is the ‘responsibility hypothesis’ 
(cfr. Nannestad and Paldam, 1994).  This states that voters assess the performance of 
their political leaders and hold them responsible for the state of the country’s affairs.  
The basic idea of this proposition can be rooted in behavioural assumptions on voter 
rationality (cfr. Downs, 1957; Key, 1966).  Still, more recently, models based on 
rational expectations have provided a firmer theoretical basis for the ‘responsibility 
hypothesis’.  In the competency model of Rogoff and Sibert (1988), for example, parties 
differ in their ability to generate desired (economic) outcomes.  While this competency 
cannot be directly observed by the electorate, it can be judged by evaluating past 
(economic) outcomes. Hence, the more positive the voter evaluates the performance of 
its political leaders, the more competent these leaders are assumed to be and the more 
popular they become. Based on this ‘responsibility hypothesis’, positive economic 
developments (such as higher growth, lower inflation and lower unemployment) have 
been argued to increase incumbent’s popularity (and election prospects). By simple 
extension of this model, political leaders might also be held responsible for tax policies. 
The reason is that voters care about taxes (as illustrated by the survey research cited 
above) and are therefore likely to be influenced by them in their assessment of their 
political leaders. Moreover, a higher tax burden is generally seen as ‘bad’ since each 
voter rather pays less than more taxes. Hence, a first hypothesis can be derived as 
follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Increases in the tax burden negatively affect government popularity, 
while decreases positively affect government popularity. 
 
It should be noted that the above line of argument first of all assumes that voters are 
backward-looking (using historical developments to assess politicians). While one 
might argue that rational voters should be prospective rather than retrospective at 
election time, this argument is less persuasive for popularity ratings. Indeed, in elections 
one chooses a future government (supporting a prospective attitude), while in popularity 
polls people think less about future governments and simply give their ‘gut feeling’ 
about the situation right now (supporting a retrospective view) (Paldam, 1991: 16). Still, 
Nannestad and Paldam (1994) and Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000) show that in reality 
the differences between both approaches are small because the relevant expectations 
tend to be rather static. Moreover, previous analyses illustrate that voters react more to 
past changes than to forecasts (e.g. Lanoue, 1994; Veiga and Veiga, 2004), supporting 
our use of historical (rather than predicted) economic indicators. Secondly, the 
reasoning underlying Hypothesis 1 assumes sociotropic rather than egotropic voters:  
i.e. people react more to the state of the country at large than their own pocketbook. 
This follows the consensus among most scholars that national (sociotropic) conditions 
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are most relevant (e.g. Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979; Fiorina, 1981; Jacobson, 1983; 
Rattinger, 1986; Lewis-Beck, 1988; Feldman and Conley, 1991).  
 
Importantly, the opposition may also – at least partly – be held responsible for enacted 
policies (or failing to obstruct undesirable policies).  In the German setting analysed 
here, the reason for such an effect can be found in the co-decision procedures at the 
German federal level between the Bundestag and Bundesrat.  The Bundestag consists of 
federally elected politicians while the Bundesrat houses representatives from the Länder 
(i.e. elected at the Land-level).  As many types of legislation need the approval of both 
political bodies, the Bundesrat holds significant power in the legislative process.  This is 
important since the Bundesrat often has a majority of members allied to parties which 
are in the opposition at the federal level (this was effectively the case over most of the 
period studied here).  Under such ‘divided government’, the opposition can block (or, at 
least, postpone) legislative proposals brought forward by the government.  Hence, 
assuming the German voter understands the co-decision procedures and has some 
information on the distribution of power in both Bundestag and Bundesrat, (s)he may 
hold the opposition partly responsible for undesirable policies when this opposition has 
significant political power via a majority position in the Bundesrat (i.e. under ‘divided 
government’).2  When the government also controls a majority in the Bundesrat (i.e. 
under ‘unified government’), the opposition has only limited political power and should 
not be punished for undesirable policies.  In fact, a higher tax burden may in such a 
situation even be beneficial for the opposition and lead it to become more popular 
through voters’ hopes for different policies under the current opposition.  This leads to 
the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Increases in the tax burden are likely to negatively affect opposition 
popularity under ‘divided government’ (when the opposition has 
political power in at least one government body).    
Hypothesis 2b: Increases in the tax burden are likely to have no or a positive effect on 
opposition popularity under ‘unified government’ (when the 
government controls all government bodies). 
 
Finally, the total tax burden facing (German) citizens consists of taxes decided upon at 
three levels of government: federal, regional and local.  However, one might argue that 
voters should primarily take into account the tax burden due to the incumbent at a 
certain level of government.  The reason is that, for example, federal politicians cannot 
be held responsible for local decisions since they have no say in the decision-process.  
Nonetheless, decisions by the federal government may sometimes indirectly affect 
regional (or local) tax burdens.  For example, reductions in federal grants to lower-level 
governments may invoke local tax increases.  Still, the impact of such events on federal 
government popularity is likely to be small for two reasons.  Firstly, voters need to be 
aware (and believe) that the increased local tax burden is due to federal government 
policy changes.  Secondly, unless the federal policy change has an impact on tax 
policies of all local governments, the effect in one particular municipality or state is 
unlikely to affect overall federal government popularity.  Consequently, we formulate 
the following hypothesis: 
                                                          
2  We are grateful to Gebhard Kirchgässner for drawing our attention to this issue.  Note that in most 
countries opposition parties have the ability to propose amendments or are represented in policy 
committees.  As such, they play some role in the proceedings and the argument made here may 
therefore transcend our German setting. 
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Hypothesis 3: Voters only punish/reward the federal government (opposition) for 
changes in the tax burden at the federal level, and do not take into 
account the tax burden imposed by lower levels of government. 
 
3. Review of the literature 
3.1. VP function analyses in Germany 
Various scholars have previously analysed the determinants of popularity ratings (or 
election results) of the German government, Chancellor or political parties.  Like most 
of the VP-function literature, the majority of these studies concentrate on the effect of 
objective or subjective economic conditions (i.c. unemployment, income and inflation).3  
In one of the first studies on Germany, Kirchgässner (1976, 1977) shows that inflation 
and unemployment significantly reduce German government popularity – with 
unemployment usually having a stronger impact (see also Frey and Schneider, 1981).4    
Building on this finding, Rattinger (1979) and Feld and Kirchgässner (2000) explicitly 
concentrate on the effects of unemployment.  Rattinger (1979) thereby makes a 
distinction between structural and cyclical unemployment.  His results show that 
structural unemployment increases the vote share of the traditional parties (CDU and 
SPD) while cyclical unemployment benefits the Social-Democrats (SPD) and hurts the 
Christian-Democrats (CDU).  Feld and Kirchgässner (2000) distinguish between official 
and hidden unemployment during the Kohl-era (i.e. 1984-1996) and find that both 
significantly negatively affect government popularity, while raising that of the 
opposition (especially in the former East-German states, where hidden unemployment 
was more of a problem).   
 
Still, there is no uniform support in German studies for the thesis that economic 
conditions influence government popularity (or election results).  For example, Norpoth 
and Yantek (1983) and Schimek (1986) find no relation between unemployment and 
inflation and German government popularity in the 1970s.  More recent studies by 
Rattinger and co-authors similarly do not always retrieve an impact of economic 
conditions on individual voting behaviour (e.g. Rattinger, 2000; Maier and Rattinger, 
1999, 2004; Kellerman and Rattinger, 2006).  Anderson (1995a, 93) does not negate the 
effect of economic variables but argues that their effect is strongly ‘mediated by the 
choices available to citizens to express their discontent’.  In line with this argument, his 
empirical analysis illustrates that the effect of macro-economic performance on 
government popularity is stronger when the effective number of parties in the political 
system is higher.  Moreover, Anderson (1995b, Ch. 6) shows that economic 
performance may affect the political support of various parties in a coalition 
government differently (depending on the coalition partners’ perceived issue 
competences).   
 
Finally, it is important to note that some scholars have gone beyond economic variables 
as potential explanations of German government popularity.  Norpoth and Goergen 
(1990) and Goergen and Norpoth (1991), for example, introduce the notion of a 
                                                          
3  Two studies explaining German government (or Chancellor) popularity introduce a tax variable, 
namely Frey and Schneider (1981) and Cusack (1999).  Their results are presented in section 2.2. 
4  Kirchgässner’s later work devoted much attention to the causal nature of this relation and illustrates 
that individual voting intentions in Germany are ‘strongly influenced by the perceived economic 
situation’ (Kirchgässner, 1985b, 155; see also Kirchgässner, 1985a, 1986). 
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‘popularity credit’ which governments enjoy at the beginning of their term. This post-
election boom in popularity is, in contrast to the (closely related) ‘honeymoon effect’ 
introduced by Mueller (1970), not ‘condemned to vanish’ as ‘by some natural law’, but 
depends on how the government handles the ‘problems that brought down its 
predecessor’ (Goergen and Norpoth, 1991, 196).  Anderson (1996) illustrates that the 
popularity of the governing party in Germany is significantly inter-related with the 
popularity of its leader (i.e. the Chancellor).  A more popular leader is able to prop up 
the popularity of his/her party (although (s)he is in turn affected by the (un)popularity of 
his/her party).  Gschwend and Norpoth (2000) and Norpoth and Gschwend (2003) also 
find a relation between chancellor popularity and the vote share of the government 
parties (though, in contrast to the previously mentioned studies, their model is built with 
the explicit aim to predict future election outcomes). 
 
3.2. The cost of taxation to politicians 
The potential costs of taxation to politicians are twofold.  Firstly, it may make them 
unpopular.  Secondly, it might increase the probability of their dismissal during the next 
election.  These ‘political’ (in terms of popularity) and ‘electoral’ costs (in terms of re-
election odds or vote shares) are often not clearly distinguished.  Nonetheless, there is 
an obvious qualitative difference between opinion polls and elections (Chapell, 1990; 
Fox and Phillips, 2003): i.c. being unpopular may make it more difficult to govern, but 
not being elected makes it impossible.5  Hence, although popularity and re-election 
probabilities are often strongly related (e.g. Sigelman, 1979; Brody and Sigelman, 1983; 
Vermeir, 2006), understanding what drives popularity between elections and election 
outcomes on Election Day should be seen as different though complementary projects.   
Keeping this caveat in mind, the remainder of this section reviews studies assessing 
both the ‘political’ and ‘electoral’ costs of taxation to get a more comprehensive view 
(and both approaches turn out to be equally inconclusive). 
 
The ‘political’ and ‘electoral’ costs of taxation have mainly been investigated by 
looking at the effect of the total tax burden imposed on the population (measured 
through total tax revenues).  This indicator was first employed in two studies of US 
gubernatorial election results (Pomper, 1968; Turett, 1971), both of which fail to find a 
consistent relation between taxation and the incumbent governor’s electoral result.  This 
(non-)finding was replicated by Hansen (1999) using US governor popularity ratings 
rather than election results.  Other studies, however, illustrate that the total tax burden 
does negatively affect the popularity or election results of US governors (e.g. Peltzman, 
1992; Lowry et al., 1998; Sobel, 1998; Kelleher and Wolak, 2007)6, the US president 
(e.g. Niskanen, 1975, 1979; Peltzman, 1992; Cuzán and Bundrick, 1999; Geys and 
Vermeir, 2008; see, however, Hibbs, 2000) and the British government (Pissarides, 
1980).7  Hence, for both the ‘electoral’ and the ‘political’ cost of taxation, evidence 
appears to be mixed when using the total tax burden as independent variable.  
                                                          
5  We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this insight. 
6  Lowry et al. (1998) and Sobel (1998) show that taxation affects the two main US political parties 
differently.  This effect, however, appears to depend on whether or not there is unified (rather than 
divided) government (Lowry et al., 1998). 
7  A number of studies focus on revenues from direct income taxation only.  While Hibbs and Madsen 
(1981), Frey and Schneider (1981), Happy (1992) and Cusack (1999) show that increasing direct 
income taxation is politically costly in the US, Canada and Germany, Peltzman (1992) fails to 
corroborate this using US data.  Related, Case (1994) and Besley and Case (1995) show that 
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Given the complexity of real world tax systems, however, it may be of interest to 
distinguish between different types of taxation and assess their relative marginal costs.  
In doing so, Paldam and Schneider (1980) find that prior to 1970 only direct income 
taxation (negatively) affects the popularity of Danish parties.  During the 1970’s, 
however, both direct and indirect taxation significantly depress popularity.  Landon and 
Ryan (1997) confirm the importance of distinguishing various types of taxation in a 
study of elections in the Canadian provinces between 1961 and 1990.  While revenues 
from licences, permits and other fees positively influence the incumbent vote share, 
sales taxes have the reverse effect (direct income taxes and fuel taxes furthermore 
significantly increase the probability of incumbent defeat).  Similarly, tax rate increases 
are found to be politically more costly for sales taxes than for income or ‘sin’ taxes (i.e. 
taxes on beer, gasoline and cigarettes) (Kone and Winters, 1993; Stults and Winters, 
2005).8  Using a comprehensive, single measure of taxation in VP function estimations 
may thus not be optimal. 
 
Finally, a similar ambiguity as observed above is found in studies examining the 
‘electoral’ cost of introducing new taxes.  Whereas Eismeier (1979) finds new taxes to 
negatively affect the incumbent US governor’s vote share, Kone and Winters (1993) 
cannot confirm this when concentrating on new sales or income taxes in the same 
setting.  Gibson (1994), assessing the UK’s poll tax introduction by the Conservative 
party in 1990, finds a significant negative impact on the Conservative party’s vote share 
in local elections in Birmingham.9  The ambiguity observed throughout previous 
research calls for additional analyses. One such effort for the German setting is 
presented in the remainder of this paper. 
 
4. Data description 
4.1. Popularity ratings: government and opposition 
The ‘Politbarometer’-surveys by the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (Mannheim) ask 
German citizens how satisfied they are with the performance of their government and 
opposition roughly every month since 1977.  The relevant questions are as follows: 
 
 ‘Are you rather satisfied or rather dissatisfied with the performance of the 
German government consisting of [names of parties in government]?’ 
 ‘And how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of [names of 
parties in opposition] in the opposition?’ 10 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
increasing income tax liabilities for high-income earners in the US significantly reduces the 
incumbent governor’s re-election odds. 
8  Eismeier (1979) and Johnson et al. (2005) show that tax rate increases in general are politically 
harmful for the incumbent.  Niemi et al. (1995) and MacDonald and Sigelman (1999) illustrate that 
more numerous tax increases during the legislative term significantly depress the vote or approval 
rating for the incumbent US governor. 
9  Interestingly, politicians believe that introducing new taxes invokes electoral punishment and avoid 
such actions when elections are imminent (e.g. Mikesell, 1978; Berry, 1988; Berry and Berry, 1992, 
1994; Ashworth et al., 2006).  Ashworth and Heyndels (2002) also show that changes in the tax 
structure are less likely in election years. 
10  The original German-language questions are: ‘Sind Sie mit den Leistungen der Bundesregierung aus 
(Namen der Koalitionspartner) eher zufrieden oder eher unzufrieden?’ and ‘Wie zufrieden oder 
unzufrieden sind Sie mit den Leistungen der (Namen der Oppositionsparteien) in der Opposition?’. 
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Respondents can reply on an 11-point scale ranging from -5 to +5.  Following Cusack 
(1999), we employ the share of positive assessments (i.e. +1 to +5) as our measure of 
government and opposition popularity.11  We thereby aggregate the monthly figures to 
the quarterly level to accommodate the frequency of the main independent variable in 
the analysis in section 5 (using monthly data would involve duplication of the quarterly 
taxation data, thus ‘artificially’ increasing the number of observations). 
 
It should be noted that the popularity ratings employed here do not directly measure 
vote intention nor Chancellor popularity (the two most common dependent variables in 
VP-function estimations).  However, the above popularity measure is to be preferred in 
a setting with coalition governments – as is mostly the case in Germany (see also 
Cusack, 1999, for a similar approach).  Firstly, one cannot ask respondents about their 
intention to vote for the entire coalition (since such a vote is in reality unfeasible, the 
question would lack credibility).  Aggregating vote intentions for all coalition partners 
is theoretically possible, but may not be a satisfactory reflection of government 
popularity because people intending to vote for one coalition partner might dislike the 
current coalition and prefer a different one.  Secondly, the Chancellor is a member of 
one coalition party only, and his/her popularity thus need not fully reflect that of the 
entire government.  These points notwithstanding, our measure of government 
popularity is strongly correlated with the measures employed in previous research.  For 
example, the correlation between our measure and the popularity of the German 
Chancellor is very high (r = 0.778), while its relation with the intention to vote for either 
of the government parties is even higher (r = 0.862) (Appendix B illustrates that using 
these alternative dependent variables makes little substantive difference to our results). 
 
Figure 1 contains the popularity ratings for the German government and opposition for 
the period 1977:1-2003:4.  Time is on the X-axis, while the percentage of respondents 
expressing approval of the government (or opposition) is on the Y-axis.  Although data 
are available for the former Eastern German states as of 1991, we only include 
respondents of the former West-German states.  The reason is a change in the sampling 
procedures for the Politbarometer surveys in 1996, reducing the ‘East-German’ sample 
to 25% of the ‘West-German’ one (from equal sample sizes prior to 1996).  This 
adjustment leads to an unwarranted upward shift in the overall popularity ratings in that 
year since the former East is generally (slightly) less approving than the former West.  
This re-sampling bias is avoided by concentrating on the ‘West-German’ data.  Still, 
since the ‘dynamics of the two series track very closely’ (Cusack, 1999: 642) exclusive 
reliance on the ‘West-German’ sample is unlikely to affect the results of our analysis 
(since only the level of popularity and not its variation is affected by inclusion of the 
‘East-German’ respondents). 
__________________ 
Figure 1 
about here 
__________________ 
                                                          
11  The question for the opposition slightly altered after 1989.  Rather than ask about the entire 
opposition, the new question inquires separately into the large and small opposition parties.  As the 
post-1989 data do not straightforwardly allow constructing a general opposition-assessment, we rely 
on the data for the largest opposition partner after 1989.  
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Three things are immediately apparent in Figure 1.  Firstly, the popularity of both 
government and opposition has been steadily decreasing in Germany over the period 
under study.  Secondly, significant variation exists around this downward trend.  These 
shocks appear stronger for the government than for the opposition.  They also tend to be 
more outspoken in the second half of our time frame.  Finally, and with Hypotheses 2a 
and 2b in mind, Figure 1 does little to indicate that losses in government popularity 
benefit the opposition.  In fact, there rather emerges a common movement in both series 
(e.g. the early 1990s). 
 
4.2. Tax burden 
To measure the German tax burden, we rely on quarterly data provided by the National 
Institute of Statistics (Statistisches Bundesamt) concerning total tax revenues in 
Germany over the period 1977:1-2003:4 (the most recent data available).  To control for 
seasonal effects (which are strong given the way taxes are collected over the year), we 
concentrate on year-on-year deviations in real total tax revenues (in 2000 prices).  These 
year-on-year tax revenue changes are portrayed in Figure 2.  Before discussing this 
figure, it should be mentioned that the data refer to West-Germany up to 1990 and cover 
Germany entirely as of 1991.  This change explains the steep increase in tax revenues in 
1991 observed in Figure 2.  However, the difference in territorial area before and after 
1991 implies that the year-on-year change in revenues cannot be evaluated in this year.  
Hence, we exclude 1991 from our later analysis (though we show the data here to 
preserve a complete picture). 
 
__________________ 
Figure 2 
about here 
__________________ 
 
From Figure 2, it is clear that most of the period up to the end of the millennium is 
characterized by increasing tax revenues, with some obvious exceptions in, for example, 
the early 1980s, 1993 and 1997.  These developments are clearly affected by the 
economic situation.  For example, the economic downturns in the early 1980s and 1993 
reduced real tax revenues.  This economic effect obviously needs to be accounted for in 
the later analysis (cfr. Cameron, 1978; Garrett, 1988; Boix, 1998).  Nonetheless, and 
importantly, German government tax policy decisions also affect the development of 
total tax revenues.  For example, tax revenues decreased strongly in 2001.  This drop 
follows two years with large numbers of new tax regulations, with an overall fiscal 
effect that the German Ministry of Finance estimated to be strongly negative (see 
Koester, 2006).  A similar relation exists also for the 1997 drop in revenues (following 
new regulations in 1995 with expected negative fiscal effects) and the rebound in tax 
revenues towards the middle of the 1980s (following tax reforms with positive expected 
fiscal effects in 1981-82). 
 
Importantly, our dataset allows a separation of tax revenues from taxes determined at 
three levels of government: i.e. federal, regional and local (thus allowing a test of 
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Hypothesis 3).  Specifically, the German federal government is responsible for 
‘Gemeinschaftsteuern’ (66% of total revenues in 2004) and ‘Bundessteuern’ (19%).  
The former are taxes for which revenues are distributed across various levels of 
government although, in most cases, the federal government independently decides on 
the tax legislation (e.g. personal income and corporate taxes).  The latter are taxes for 
which legislation and all revenues are the exclusive domain of the German national 
government (e.g. toll, alcohol and oil taxes).  The regional level in Germany determines 
the tax legislation and takes in all revenues for ‘Ländersteuern’ (5%) (e.g. inheritance 
and beer taxes).  Finally, ‘Gemeindesteuern’ (10%) are the exclusive responsibility and 
revenue source of the local governments (e.g. local property tax, taxes on second 
residences).  This four-way separation of tax revenues is presented in Figure 3 (once 
again in year-on-year changes).     
 
__________________ 
Figure 3 
about here 
__________________ 
 
All four series in Figure 3 follow the general pattern discussed above.  Nonetheless, the 
variation here is mostly larger than that observed for overall revenues.  Especially tax 
revenues at lower levels of government are volatile.  Moreover, even though the general 
pattern is similar for the four series in Table 3, deviations from the trend do not always 
coincide.  Hence, different types of revenues might have diverging effects on 
government (and opposition) popularity. 
 
5. Empirical Analysis  
5.1. Specification 
To assess our three hypotheses, we (separately) estimate a government and opposition 
popularity function for Germany over the period 1978:1-2003:4.12  Our basic 
specification is: 
 
 P Gt  = b0 + b1 P G 1t− + b2 Xt + b3 REVt + et   
 P Ot  = a0 + a1 P O 1t−  + a2 Xt + a3 REVt + a4 DG*REVt + et 
The dependent variable (P) in both equations is the year-on-year change in the 
popularity rating of the government (indicated by superscript G) or opposition 
(superscript O) as defined in section 4.1.13  We thus estimate the model in changes, 
                                                          
12  Data availability imposes this starting point.  As mentioned, 1991 is removed from the sample.  With 
data points lost due to the lagged dependent variable, we are left with 94 observations. 
13  Alternatively, we define government (opposition) popularity as the share of people showing approval 
(+1 to +5) minus the proportion expressing disapproval (-1 to -5). This change in the dependent 
variable leaves our conclusions unaffected (full results available upon request). 
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rather than levels.  Both types of estimation have been used in the prior literature and it 
is not clear a priori which one is to be preferred on a theoretical basis.  Here, however, 
estimation in changes is dictated by the structure of the data (i.e. the need to define year-
on-year deviations to correct for strong seasonal effects in the economic and taxation 
data).  As explanatory variables, our model first of all includes one lag of the dependent 
variable (Pt-1).  This picks up slow adjustment of popularity ratings and also tackles the 
problem of autocorrelation (which is present when this lag is left out).  Slow adjustment 
of popularity is a common finding in the literature and indicates the weight of past 
events on voters’ decision-making process (e.g. Frey and Schneider, 1978; Kernell, 
1978; Geys and Vermeir, 2008). 
 
Central to the analysis is a measure for the tax burden (REVt).  It is operationalised as 
the real year-on-year percentage change in total tax revenues (as depicted in Figure 2) 
or, alternatively, the real year-on-year percentage change in tax revenues from the four 
taxation types distinguished in Figure 3.  As argued in Hypothesis 1, we expect a higher 
tax burden to lower the government’s approval ratings; i.e. b3 < 0.14  Hypotheses 2a and 
2b indicate that this (expected) loss in government popularity is most likely to be 
complemented by a loss of support for the opposition when it has significant political 
power (that is, when it holds the majority position in the Bundesrat).  Indeed, 
ratification of undesirable policies when it has the power to block or delay them may 
lead to popular retribution for the opposition.  When the opposition is powerless, it is 
more likely to remain unaffected by (or even gain from) unpopular actions taken by the 
government.  To capture this, we define an indicator variable (DG) equal to 1 in 
situations of ‘divided government’ (0 otherwise) and interact this with the tax burden 
variable.15  Hypotheses 2a and 2b then predict that a3 > 0 and a4 < 0.  Importantly, as 
voters might hold the government responsible only for taxation when it has a distinct 
influence on the tax burden (cfr. Hypothesis 3), significant coefficient estimates for the 
taxation variables are expected to be constrained to ‘Gemeinschaftssteuern’ and 
‘Bundessteuern’.  Since the other two types of taxation (i.c. ‘Landessteuern’ and 
‘Gemeindesteuern’) are imposed at lower levels of government, no effect of these 
revenues is expected at the federal level.16 
 
Our vector of control variables, Xt, contains both economic and political controls.  As 
economic variables, we include inflation (i.e. the year-on-year percentage change in the 
Consumer Price Index) and unemployment (i.e. the year-on-year deviation in the 
unemployment rate).  Both are expected to depress the government’s popularity and 
(potentially) increase that of the opposition.  Note that we experimented with the year-
on-year growth rate of real GDP.  This, however, proved to be insignificant once 
unemployment is taken into account (although it consistently has the expected positive 
sign).  Hence, given the strong relation between unemployment and real GDP growth (r 
                                                          
14  This assumes that the government is on average taxing on the left side of the Laffer curve (such that 
increasing tax rates increase revenues).  While this is not necessarily the case for all taxes (e.g. 
cigarette tax increases tend to decrease revenues, but are nonetheless unpopular), the assumption is 
reasonable when regarding overall tax policies.  We thank Kai A. Konrad for this insight. 
15  To accurately measure and interpret this interaction term, we also include the dummy for divided 
government as control variable in the estimations. 
16  When the regional (or municipal) government has the same political constellation as the federal 
government, voters’ disapproval with local taxation might, however, ‘spill over’ to the federal 
government (affecting the federal government’s popularity in these particular states).  Unfortunately, 
our data do not allow us to test this effect. 
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= -0.57), we exclude this variable from the final model (results including GDP are 
available upon request, and similar to those presented). 
 
As political variables, we first include two dummy variables for governments headed by 
Helmut Kohl (1 between 1982:4 and 1998:3, 0 otherwise) and Gerhard Schröder (1 
between 1998:4 and 2003:4, 0 otherwise).  The reference category is Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt.  These administration dummies pick up Chancellor-specific effects on 
government popularity ratings.  Our second political variable assesses the existence of a 
‘honeymoon’ effect (or ‘popularity credit’).  This relates to the period of goodwill that a 
government faces in the first quarters of its term (Mueller, 1970; Smyth and Dua, 1989; 
Goergen and Norpoth, 1991; Fox and Phillips, 2003).  We measure this through a 
variable that is 4, 3, 2 and 1 in the second, third, fourth and fifth quarter of each 
administration respectively, and 0 in all other quarters (the first quarter of each 
government is dropped due to a lack of lagged dependent variable for those periods).  
The third political variable intends to capture ‘pre-election rebounds’ in politician’s 
popularity (e.g. Frey and Schneider, 1978; Nannestad and Paldam, 1994; Schmitt and 
Wüst, 2006).  Party leaders are very active in this period to present themselves from 
their best side to convince voters of their abilities (Goodhardt and Bhansali, 1970; 
Cusack, 1999).  We model this effect as a dummy equal to 1 in the election year, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Finally, we add a set of dummy variables to control for various time-specific events.  
The fall of the Berlin Wall, for example, has been argued to have created a (temporary) 
surge in government popularity (Cusack, 1999).  We capture this by a dummy variable 
equal to 1 in the period 1989:3-1990:1.  More recently, a scandal over illegal CDU party 
donations – uncovered at the beginning of the millennium – is argued to have aided the 
popularity of the ruling SPD-Green government in the first quarters of 2000 (Schmitt 
and Wüst, 2006).  This boost in government popularity was probably also supported by 
the government’s promise in January 2000 to ‘invest’ €125 million to aid the bailout of 
Germany’s biggest construction company (i.e. Philipp Holzmann A.G.), thereby saving 
up to 70.000 jobs.  We capture the effect of these events through a dummy variable 
equal to 1 in the period 2000:1-2000:3.  Preliminary analysis also indicated significant 
outliers in the popularity series for the quarters 1988:1, 1992:1, 1993:1, 1994:1, 1999:3-
4; 2002:2 and 2002:4.  Dummy variables for these quarters were included in all analyses 
to control for events causing a shock to popularity ratings in these periods (cfr. Feld and 
Kirchgässner, 2000).  Summary statistics for all variables are presented in Appendix A. 
 
5.2. Results 
Before running the model, we test for non-stationarity through augmented Dickey-
Fuller unit-root tests.  Following a general-to-specific rule (cfr. Hall, 1994; Maddala and 
Kim, 2004), we start out with a large number of lags (kmax) and remove these until the 
largest one is statistically significant at conventional levels.  In line with Schwert 
(1989), we thereby set kmax equal to the integer part of 12.(T/100)1/4, with T representing 
the number of observations.  As T = 94 observations, kmax = 11 lags.  Note also that 
inclusion of a trend variable and constant term in the test procedure was based on 
statistical significance of these variables.  This follows Guilkey and Schmidt (1991) and 
Elder and Kennedy (2001) who argue that including too many such ‘deterministic’ 
variables reduces the power of the test while incorrectly excluding them biases it in 
favour of the unit-root null hypothesis.  The results of the unit root tests (presented in 
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Table 1) indicate that all variables except inflation are stationary.  As the first difference 
of this variable is stationary, we include inflation in first-differenced form (implying we 
introduce the change in the inflation rate). 
 
__________________ 
Table 1 
about here 
__________________ 
 
Our main estimation results are given in Table 2.  We provide three sets of results.  
Columns (1) and (4) show the basic results in which the taxation effect is estimated 
through total tax revenues.  In Columns (2) and (5), we differentiate between the four 
tax sources distinguished in Figure 3.  Finally, Columns (3) and (6) present results from 
a differentiation between expected and unexpected tax revenue changes (explained 
below).   
 
__________________ 
Table 2 
about here 
__________________ 
 
Before discussing the central – fiscal – variables, we briefly summarize the main 
findings with respect to our control variables.  Firstly, for both government and 
opposition, the lagged dependent variable indicates that 50 to 58 percent of the change 
in the popularity rating persists into the subsequent period, indicating slow adjustment 
of political popularity.  Secondly, unemployment exerts a strong negative influence on 
government popularity, though it does not affect the popularity of the opposition.  
Inflation has a marginal (and unexpectedly positive) effect on both government and 
opposition popularity.  The latter might indicate that the electorate understands that the 
Bundesbank – which was highly independent and committed to its inflation target 
(Schächter and Stokman, 1995; Lohmann, 1998; Cusack, 1999) – rather than the 
government was to be held responsible for inflation. 
 
The political variables in the model mostly confirm earlier findings.  First, the highly 
significant positive honeymoon effect shows that the public’s endorsement of the 
government is higher in the first quarters of its term (cfr. Mueller, 1970).  
Unsurprisingly, no such honeymoon effect exists for the opposition.  Second, there is a 
significant pre-election rebound for both government and opposition, though it is 
stronger for the former.  Third, the fall of the Berlin wall boosted the German 
government’s popularity.  As the opposition failed to gain popularity from it, this 
breakthrough was apparently perceived as a success of the government only.  Fourth, 
the insignificant effect of the divided government variable indicates that it plays little 
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role whether or not the government controls both the Bundestag and Bundesrat (though, 
as noted below, divided versus unified government does influence the taxation effects; 
cfr. Lowry et al., 1998 for the US). The other time-specific effects included in the 
regression are individually and jointly highly significant, indicating the importance of 
including these variables to avoid misspecification.  Finally, the administration 
dummies indicate that Chancellor-specific effects on German popularity ratings are at 
best rather weak (ceteris paribus).   
 
Turning our attention to the tax variables, the results provide clear support for 
Hypothesis 1: there is a significant negative impact of taxation on government 
popularity (Column (1)).  Specifically, a one standard deviation change in tax revenues 
(i.e. 4%) alters the share of respondents that have a positive evaluation of their 
government with approximately 1.6%.  With respect to Hypothesis 2a, Column (4) 
shows that this loss of government popularity weakly benefits the opposition when this 
opposition has no control over the Bundesrat (i.e. in cases of ‘unified government’).  
However, and in line with Hypothesis 2b, when the opposition does have a majority 
position in the Bundesrat, it appears to lose from an increasing tax burden (though the 
effect fails to reach statistical significance at the 5% level).  Voters thus appear to 
understand the co-decision arrangement between Bundestag and Bundesrat and hold the 
opposition partly responsible for tax policies when it has control over the Bundesrat.17 
 
Distinguishing between four tax revenue streams depending on the level of government 
that is responsible for them (see above) in Columns (2) and (5) suggests that not all 
taxes matter equally.  In line with Hypothesis 3, the federal government is only 
punished for taxes that derive from federal tax legislation and accrue (at least in part) to 
the federal government.  The effect of taxation at lower levels of government is 
statistically insignificant (and even positively signed).  The opposition gains from 
higher ‘Gemeinschaftssteuern’ when it has no controlling stake in the Bundesrat, while 
the reverse holds under divided government (as expected under Hypotheses 2a and 2b).  
The remaining tax sources do not significantly affect the opposition.  Still, as can be 
seen in Table B1 in Appendix B, this finding weakens when using Chancellor 
popularity or government/opposition vote shares as alternative independent variables.  
While Gemeinschaftssteuern always has the strongest effect (both qualitatively and 
statistically), none of the tax variables is statistically distinguishable from 0 (note, 
however, that the results regarding the total tax burden do hold up using these 
alternative dependent variables!).   
 
Finally, as mentioned before, tax revenues are influenced by both the economy and tax 
policy.  Hence, in Columns (3) and (6), we separate these effects using a two-stage 
estimation procedure proposed by Besley and Case (1995).  Specifically, we first run an 
auxiliary regression in which we relate tax revenue changes to lagged tax revenue 
changes and current values for GDP growth.18  Then, the predicted values from this 
                                                          
17  An anonymous referee indicated that the costs of taxation may vary across governments of differing 
partisan leaning (cfr. Lowry et al., 1998; Sobel, 1998).  To test this hypothesis, we included of a set 
of interaction terms (i.e. interacting the taxation variables with a dummy variable equal to 1 when 
SPD led the governing coalition; 0 when CDU did).  The results show no significant differences in 
the cost of taxation for SPD and CDU-led governments over the period studied. 
18  The results from this first stage regression are: ∆ Taxrev t = -0.003 + 0.552 ∆ Taxrevt-1 + 0.005 
GDPgrowtht.  The coefficient estimates for both the lag of tax revenue changes and GDP growth are 
statistically significant beyond the 99% confidence level.  Note also that unemployment and inflation 
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auxiliary regression (i.e. tax revenue changes which are ‘expected’ based on past 
changes and current economic events) and the residuals (i.e. ‘unexpected’ tax revenue 
changes, which tap into changes due to legislative actions) are added to the popularity 
function.  Though this separation has theoretical merit, its empirical foundation is 
weaker.  Firstly, it assumes voters’ understanding of the impact of economic variables 
on fiscal outcomes and their ability to distinguish this from policy effects.  This 
appears, at best, implausible (Besley and Case, 1995).  Secondly, voters may simply 
want to punish unfavourable fiscal outcomes independent of their cause.  Our findings 
provide some support for the latter point of view.  Indeed, overall, the results show that 
the difference between the effects of ‘expected’ and ‘unexpected’ fiscal outcomes is at 
best statistically weak (as shown by the F-test at the bottom of Table 2, Columns (3) and 
(6)).   
 
6. Conclusion 
The literature on VP-functions shows that taxation often has an important effect on the 
popularity ratings and re-election odds of politicians.  The present paper has provided a 
re-analysis of this taxation-popularity nexus using German data.  Given the near-
exclusive reliance in previous studies on US or UK data, such an extension to other 
countries is warranted to provide a more general view on the effect of taxation on 
popularity ratings (or election results).   
 
The results allow us to formulate four conclusions.  Firstly, taxation significantly 
reduces government popularity in Germany over the period 1978-2003.  There thus is a 
clear disciplining reaction of voters towards governments that increase the tax burden.  
Secondly, this effect is not automatically translated into a more popular opposition.  In 
fact, the opposition generally only gains (and then only insignificantly so) when it has 
no direct political power (i.e. when there is ‘unified government’).  When the 
government is ‘divided’ – i.e. the opposition is in control of the Bundesrat – the 
opposition tends to be punished for increased taxation.  Thirdly, voters assign blame 
mainly for tax revenues that are under the direct influence of the federal government 
(i.e. Gemeinschafts- and Bundessteuern) and do not punish the government for a tax 
burden imposed by a lower level of government.  Finally, no distinction is made by 
voters between tax revenue increases due to economic growth and those deriving from 
legislative changes.  This may indicate bounded voter rationality in the sense that voters 
are probably unable to make a clear distinction between the various sources of tax 
burden increases – and therefore punish politicians equally for all increases.   
 
Overall, it is clear that taxation matters. People dislike taxation and are willing (and 
capable) to show this resentment, leading to reduced popularity of politicians deemed 
responsible for a higher tax burden. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
are insignificant when added and were therefore not retained.  This indicates – in line with Koester 
(2006) – that the main economic determinant of tax revenues is economic growth. 
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Appendix A: Summary statistics  
 
Table A1: Summary Statistics (N=94) 
 
Variable 
 
 
Mean 
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
Government Approval 
(year-on-year change) -1.239 11.67 -24.63 25.40 
Opposition Approval 
(year-on-year change) -0.209 7.76 -24.50 16.83 
GDP Growth 1.725 2.26 -2.76 7.35 
Inflation 2.516 1.78 -0.95 7.13 
Unemployment  
(year-on year change) 0.049 0.14 -0.15 0.53 
Tax Revenues 
(year-on-year change) 0.014 0.04 -0.08 0.14 
Gemeinschaftssteuern 
(year-on-year change) 0.014 0.04 -0.11 0.10 
Bundessteuern 
(year-on-year change) 0.024 0.11 -0.29 0.52 
Laendessteuern 
(year-on-year change) 0.010 0.07 -0.17 0.21 
Gemeindesteuern 
(year-on-year change) 0.004 0.07 -0.26 0.21 
Divided Government 0.649 0.48 0 1 
Honeymoon 0.213 0.77 0 4 
Election year 0.277 0.45 0 1 
Wall down 0.032 0.18 0 1 
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Appendix B: Results using alternative independent variables 
 
Table B1: Determinants of German government and opposition approval ratings 1978-2003 
 Vote share 
Governing 
parties 
Vote share 
Governing 
parties 
Vote share 
Opposition 
parties 
Vote share 
Opposition 
parties 
Popularity 
Chancellor 
Popularity 
Chancellor 
Intercept -3.390 * 
(-1.71) 
-3.437 * 
(-1.64) 
0.969 
(0.38) 
0.770 
(0.32) 
-2.343 
(-1.06) 
-2.820 
(-1.22) 
Approval (t-1) 
(year-on-year change) 
0.452 *** 
(5.74) 
0.415 *** 
(4.55) 
0.422 *** 
(4.34) 
0.384 *** 
(3.84) 
0.738 *** 
(13.03) 
0.744 *** 
(12.21) 
Unemployment rate 
(year-on-year change) 
-11.472 ** 
(-2.31) 
-12.211 ** 
(-2.55) 
2.860 
(0.54) 
4.967 
(0.98) 
-9.932 * 
(-1.77) 
-9.553 * 
(-1.64) 
Inflation rate 
(first difference) 
1.378 
(1.23) 
1.430  
(1.21) 
-1.142 
(-0.91) 
-1.039  
(-0.85) 
2.622 **  
(2.09) 
2.961 **  
(2.25) 
Tax Revenues 
(year-on-year change) 
-34.919 * 
(-1.95) 
- 20.640 
(0.59) 
- -38.783 * 
(-1.94) 
- 
Tax revenues * 
Divided Government 
- - -44.173 
(-1.05) 
- - - 
Gemeinschaftssteuern 
(year-on-year change) 
- -20.243 
(-1.19) 
- 44.191 
(1.35) 
- -25.714 * 
(-1.73) 
Bundessteuern 
(year-on-year change) 
- 0.855 
(0.14) 
- -29.001 
(-1.02) 
- -9.609 
(-1.38) 
Laendessteuern 
(year-on-year change) 
- -3.493 
(-0.45) 
- -4.863 
(-0.38) 
- 8.482 
(1.00) 
Gemeindesteuern 
(year-on-year change) 
- -10.171 
(-1.05) 
- -17.236 
(-0.95) 
- -8.764 
(-0.87) 
Gemeinschaftssteuern* 
Divided Government 
 - - -46.426 
(-1.19) 
- - 
Bundessteuern * 
Divided Government 
- - - 5.839 
(0.20) 
- - 
Laendessteuern * 
Divided Government 
- - - 0.015 
(0.00) 
- - 
Gemeindesteuern * 
Divided Government 
- - - 28.199 
(1.41) 
- - 
Divided Government 0.980 (0.76) 
0.744 
(0.57) 
0.157 
(0.09) 
0.052 
(0.03) 
0.167 
(0.11) 
0.432 
(0.29) 
Honeymoon 3.792 *** 
(4.75) 
3.889 *** 
(4.67) 
-1.491 * 
(-1.83) 
-1.984 ** 
(-2.59) 
3.101 *** 
(3.63) 
3.043 *** 
(3.48) 
Election year 4.033 *** 
(3.27) 
4.154 *** 
(3.21) 
-1.508 
(-1.07) 
-1.172 
(-0.81) 
5.380 *** 
(3.84) 
5.278 *** 
(3.62) 
Wall down 5.229 ** 
(1.96) 
5.942 ** 
(2.06) 
-3.413 
(-1.17) 
-0.886 
(-0.26) 
3.313 
(1.11) 
3.678 
(1.14) 
 
F (Event dummies) 4.82 *** 4.15 *** 3.64 *** 4.87 *** 14.20 *** 13.03 *** 
F (Administrations) 1.87 1.87 0.24 0.67 0.90 1.12 
 
R2 adj 
Breusch-Godfrey 
Heteroscedasticity 
RESET³ 
 
68.43 
5.85 ** 
0.14 
1.31 
 
68.69 
7.15 *** 
0.09 
1.39 
 
52.67 
0.21 
3.18 
1.71 
 
53.19 
0.97 
7.54 *** 
1.59 
 
84.92 
1.06 
0.39 
1.28 
 
85.36 
0.82 
0.07 
1.78 
Note:  N = 94. t-values between brackets. *** significant at 1%; ** at 5% and * at 10%.  F(Event dummies) and 
F(Administrations) test joint significance of time-specific and administration-specific effects, Breusch-
Godfrey and Heteroscedasticity assess autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity respectively.  RESET3 is 
Ramsey’s (1969) specification error test.  
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Figure 1: Popularity of German government and opposition: 1977:1-2003:4 (%) 
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Figure 2: Year-on-year change in real total tax revenues: 1977:1-2003:4 (%) 
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Figure 3: Year-on-year change in real total tax revenues  
at different government levels: 1977:1-2003:4 (%) 
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Table 1: Results from Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-root tests 
Variable # lags τµ Inference 
Government Approval b 9 -4.51*** Stationary 
Opposition Approval b 9 -3.97*** Stationary 
Tax Revenues c 4 -3.69 *** Stationary 
Gemeinschaftssteuern b 4 -2.95 *** Stationary 
Bundessteuern b 10 -1.98 ** Stationary 
Landessteuern b 8 -2.22 ** Stationary 
Gemeindesteuern b 11 -2.46 ** Stationary 
Unemployment b 1 -3.22 *** Stationary 
Real GDP growth c 3 -3.28 *** Stationary 
Inflation a 9 -2.70 Unit root 
Inflation, first differences b 11 -3.63*** Stationary 
Note:  Critical values τµ, are in Fuller (1976). Inclusion of a drift parameter (or constant 
term) and time trend were based on statistical significance of these variables.  
Superscript a refers to inclusion of both constant and time trend, superscript b 
indicates the absence of both while superscript c implies inclusion of a constant 
term only. 
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Table 2: Determinants of German government and opposition approval ratings 1978-2003 
 (1) 
GOV 
(2) 
GOV 
(3) 
GOV 
(4) 
OPP 
(5) 
OPP 
(6) 
OPP 
Intercept -4.063 * 
(-1.84) 
-3.595 
(-1.58) 
-4.212 * 
(-1.81) 
-4.576 
(-1.54) 
-3.283 
(-1.11) 
-2.041 
(-0.61) 
Approval (t-1) 
(year-on-year change) 
0.561 *** 
(9.43) 
0.576 *** 
(8.65) 
0.561 *** 
(9.37) 
0.523 *** 
(5.65) 
0.508 *** 
(5.28) 
0.527 *** 
(5.79) 
Unemployment rate 
(year-on-year change) 
-17.065 *** 
(-2.81) 
-17.455 ** 
(-2.72) 
-16.536 ** 
(-2.50) 
-3.080 
(-0.52) 
-5.215 
(-0.87) 
-8.827 
(-1.38) 
Inflation rate 
(first difference) 
2.223 * 
(1.78) 
2.079  
(1.62) 
2.254 * 
(1.78) 
2.350 
(1.60) 
2.175 
(1.46) 
1.904 
(1.31) 
Tax Revenues 
(year-on-year change) 
-40.234 ** 
(-2.00) 
- - 65.197 
(1.60) 
- - 
Tax revenues * Divided 
Government 
- - - -101.873 ** 
(-2.05) 
- - 
Unexpected Tax Revenue Change - - -42.230 * 
(-1.88) 
- - 89.566 * 
(1.92) 
Expected tax revenue change - - -35.428 
(-1.15) 
- - -14.614 
(-0.20) 
Unexpected tax revenue change* 
Divided Government 
- - - - - -99.425 * 
(-1.77) 
Expected Tax Revenue Change* 
Divided Government 
- - - - - -74.277 
(-0.91) 
Gemeinschaftssteuern 
(year-on-year change) 
- -46.299 ** 
(-2.49) 
- - 80.033 * 
(1.94) 
- 
Bundessteuern 
(year-on-year change) 
- -12.721 * 
(-1.84) 
- - -42.314 
(-1.19) 
- 
Laendessteuern 
(year-on-year change) 
- 13.194 
(1.58) 
- - 8.410 
(0.54) 
- 
Gemeindesteuern 
(year-on-year change) 
- 6.450 
(0.64) 
- - -21.626 
(-1.01) 
- 
Gemeinschaftssteuern *  
Divided Government 
- - - - -131.396 ** 
(-2.63) 
- 
Bundessteuern *  
Divided Government 
- - - - 20.533 
(0.56) 
- 
Laendessteuern *  
Divided Government 
- - - - 10.016 
(0.52) 
- 
Gemeindesteuern *  
Divided Government 
- - - - 41.375 
(1.66) 
- 
Divided Government 0.900 (0.62) 
1.618 
(1.10) 
0.945 
(0.64) 
2.329 
(1.06) 
2.727 
(1.25) 
1.007 
(0.36) 
Honeymoon 3.067 *** 
(3.33) 
3.152 *** 
(3.32) 
3.069 *** 
(3.31) 
0.544 
(0.57) 
0.445 
(0.47) 
0.264 
(0.25) 
Election year 6.646 *** 
(4.66) 
5.954 *** 
(4.07) 
6.662 *** 
(4.63) 
4.363 ** 
(2.44) 
4.398 ** 
(2.32) 
4.149 ** 
(2.28) 
Wall down 11.086 *** 
(3.68) 
9.549 *** 
(2.95) 
10.981 *** 
(3.57) 
1.563 
(0.45) 
4.936 
(1.19) 
3.241 
(0.87) 
F (Event dummies) 14.63 *** 14.82 *** 13.87 *** 2.67 ** 3.10 *** 2.67 ** 
F (Administrations) 2.39 * 2.40 * 2.28 0.63 0.58 0.70 
 
R2 adj 
Breusch-Godfrey 
Heteroscedasticity 
RESET³ 
F (exp = unexp) a 
 
82.84 
0.18 
0.66 
1.20 
 
83.15 
0.23 
0.96 
0.98 
 
82.61 
0.16 
0.75 
1.23 
0.04 
 
49.46 
0.15 
2.83 * 
1.83 
 
53.42 
5.513 ** 
4.13 ** 
2.61 * 
 
51.63 
0.78 
2.04 
1.24 
1.56 / 3.71* 
Note:  N = 94. t-values between brackets. *** significant at 1%; ** at 5% and * at 10%.  F(Event dummies) and 
F(Administrations) test joint significance of time-specific and administration-specific effects, Breusch-Godfrey 
and Heteroscedasticity assess autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity respectively.  RESET3 is Ramsey’s (1969) 
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specification error test.  F (exp = unexp) tests difference of the coefficients for expected and unexpected tax 
revenue changes. 
 a The first number in Column (6) is the test result for ‘unified government’, the second for ‘divided government’. 
